Once again, in 2012, thousands of voters waited in extraordinarily long lines to cast their votes in a crucial battleground state and a close presidential election, again raising concerns among public officials, the media, and voters themselves about the administration of elections at the precinct level in Florida and throughout the country. A Miami Herald headline (October 31, 2012) said that early voting in South Florida was a "Nightmare," as some early voting stations in both Broward County (Ft. Lauderdale) and Miami-Dade were plagued by long lines extending for blocks with wait times of up to six hours. Election Day itself also saw severe waits in some precincts in several counties in Florida, including Orange (Orlando), Osceola, Lee, Palm Beach, St. Lucie, and Miami-Dade, where the last person finally voted at 1:30 a.m., six and a half hours after the official poll closing time and a half an hour after Mitt Romney conceded the presidential election to Barack Obama. Florida, which twelve years earlier had kept the nation in suspense as courts and election officials struggled with the questions of how to count, and whether to recount, was once again in the electoral spotlight, this time as a "poster state" for the voters who endured long lines.
President Obama highlighted the problem in his State of the Union in February, 2013.
Defending our freedom, though, is not just the job of our military alone. We must all do our part to make sure our God-given rights are protected here at home. That includes one of the most fundamental right of a democracy: the right to vote. When any American, no matter where they live or what their party, are denied that right because they can't afford to wait for five or six or seven hours just to cast their ballot, we are betraying our ideals.
So tonight, I'm announcing a nonpartisan commission to improve the voting experience in America. And it definitely needs improvement. I'm asking two long-time experts in the field --who, by the way, recently served as the top attorneys for my campaign and for Governor Romney's campaign --to lead it. We can fix this, and we will. The American people demand it, and so does our democracy.
…
We should follow the example of a North Miami woman named Desiline Victor. When Desiline arrived at her polling place, she was told the wait to vote might be six hours. And as time ticked by, her concern was not with her tired body or aching feet, but whether folks like her would get to have their say. And hour after hour, a throng of people stayed in line to support her --because Desiline is 102 years old. And they erupted in cheers when she finally put on a sticker that read, "I voted."
In these three short paragraphs, President Obama echoed many of the concerns about reports of lengthy lines to vote. First, many observers feared that long lines may effectively deter people from exercising a most fundamental right of citizens in a democracy. In Aventura, Florida, when backed up early voting stations resulted in packed parking lots, how many potential voters who were directed by police to distant parking lots to catch a shuttle never made it back to actually cast a ballot? Second, the president's call for a non-partisan commission reflected the uncertainty among election officials about the causes of long lines. Many election officials believed that the lines were caused by an insufficient (or inefficient) deployment of resources, and responded by installing additional poll workers, check-in stations, privacy booths, and optical scanners to read ballots at certain early voting sites. Others blamed lengthy, multi-lingual ballots, or reduced hours for early voting in 2012, which resulted in more voters in the shortened early voting period and on Election Day itself. Still others noted additional requirements that resulted in more voters being required to cast provisional ballots, resulting in longer processing times. Third, by highlighting and celebrating the persistence of a 102-year-old African American woman, the president implicitly raised the question of whether long lines were more prevalent in minority communities, and whether the deterrent effects of long lines affected some groups, such as the elderly, more than others.
Of course, lengthy lines to vote pre-date 2012 and are not exclusive to Florida. Four years earlier, the frequent failure of direct-recording electronic voting ("DRE") machines used in fifty of Pennsylvania's sixty-seven counties resulted in long lines on primary election day in precincts around the state. At one polling station in North Philadelphia, both of the DRE machines were broken at 7:00 a.m., when polls were supposed to have opened. No one at the precinct could vote until one of the machines was finally repaired at 9:00 a.m., but by then, an estimated 75 to 100 prospective voters had left the queue to go to work or other appointments for the day. At another precinct in Montgomery County, a poll worker told waiting voters to go home and come back later because the DRE machines were broken. (Mukherjee 2009, 178 -188) In response, three voters, the Pennsylvania NAACP, and the Election Reform Network filed a petition in Federal District Court requesting an injuction that would require poll workers in the 2008 general election to provide emergency paper ballots to voters in precincts where at least half of the DRE machines were non-operational on Election Day. In granting the temporary injunction, Judge Bartle of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that the long wait times as a consequence of frequent machine failures was a foreseeable burden on the right to vote and "will give rise to a violation of at least the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." (NAACP State Conference of Pennsylvania vs. Cortés, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 765) The state declined to appeal, and the 50% rule established in Cortés was implemented in the 2008 general election and subsequently included in a permanent injunction. (Mukherjee 2009, 193) Thus, not only have lengthy lines to vote drawn the attention of the media and the president, but at least one federal court has ruled that long lines that resulted from foreseeable voting machine failures raised serious constitutional questions.
In spite of these constitutional and policy concerns, waiting in line is nothing new for most people. We routinely wait in lines at grocery checkouts, banks, hospital waiting rooms, airport security checkpoints, and other places, so why should voting precincts be any different? The extreme cases reported in the media, highlighted by the president, and brought to a court's attention are no doubt important to the frustrated voters, fatigued poll workers, and overwhelmed election officials at those polling stations, but what is known generally about the distribution of voter wait times? Do most voters wait in modest lines that do not seriously threaten to breach a fundamental right in a democracy? More importantly, do we know why some voters face "nightmare" lines, while others don't have to wait any longer to vote than they might at a busy neighborhood coffee shop?
Literature review

Methodological approaches
Research on voter wait times is still in its nascent stages, sparked by a few scholars with different disciplinary backgrounds who have used a variety of methods to investigate the factors that affect the distributions of voter lines. In one sense, it is frustrating that engineers, mathematicians, legal scholars, and political scientists are speaking past each other, but in another, it is quite remarkable that these varied scholars and divergent approaches seem to be converging on a consensus on a few key findings. No methods or data are perfect, but we can begin to piece together some empirical regularity in findings from mathematical models, surveys, precinct level analysis, and direct observation. Well-designed surveys such as the Pew, CCES, and SPAE studies have the natural advantage of representativeness, as carefully drawn samples can provide good estimates of a state (or states, in SPAE) or the nation as a whole, as well as differences between large subgroups. However, the measurement of wait times in surveys depends on voters accurately remembering up to several weeks after an election how long they waited to vote, which may be questionable. Exit polls might be expected provide better measures, but for now, most of those available exit poll data with voter wait time measures are geographically and temporally limited. For example, Stein and Vonnahme (2012) used exit poll data from the 2008 Colorado presidential primary, and Claassen et al (2008) collected data in two counties in Ohio in November 2006. Both studies offer important insights into the relationships between voter wait times and overall satisfaction, but lack the representativeness of national surveys.
In principle, observational data of lines at actual polling stations would provide valid measures of wait times, but in practice, they are either available only for a very limited number of precincts at a time, or at a specific time across a wide number of precincts. As one of the only published examples of the former, Spencer and Markovits (2010) observed 30 polling stations across three California counties in the 2008 California presidential primary. While that study provides the most detailed insight about bottlenecks that developed and receded throughout the day in actual precincts (and should serve as a model for future observational studies), its generality is limited to a small number of precincts in one election in one state. On the other hand, some states gather data on official closing times for each precinct throughout the state, but those data only give a glimpse of what's happening at the end of the day, ignoring the earlier ebbs and flows. Moreover, as Herron and Smith show in their careful analysis of precinct closing times in Florida in 2012, county election supervisors used varying definitions of precinct closing times in their reports to the State Division of Elections, including "the time the last voter in line was recorded as casting a ballot on a voting machine; the time a polling station clerk reported precinct results to his or her county Supervisor of Elections; the time the last voter checked in to vote via a paper poll book or on an electronic poll book (EViD); and, the time the last optical scan machine in a polling station was turned off." (Herron and Smith 2013, 12) The varying definitions limit the ability to make comparisons across counties even in a single state in a single election, though, as Herron and Smith show, comparisons across precincts within a single county are still revealing.
Finally, mathematical modeling and simulations are helpful in building theory and showing the potential effect of slight changes in the volume of demand, service time, or service capacity on expected wait times. Queueing theory has been used to predict wait times in a variety of settings such as retail stores, movement of traffic, telephone exchanges, internet traffic, and hospital emergency rooms. As described by Allen (2011) , queueing theory uses those parameters to predict distributions of wait times that enable managers to best allocate their labor and technical resources to achieve optimal service for shoppers, patients, consumers, and in our case, voters. The applications of queueing theory in the extant literature have been authored by engineers, who have applied their mathematical modeling expertise to the issue of voter queues, while that application has thus far seemed to escape the attention of most political scientists (with the notable exception of Spencer and Markovits (2010) ). These models have the advantage of an elegant theoretical framework and being fruitful in their predictions and explanations, but, because of the relative dearth of observational data, some unknown amount of empirical verisimilitude. Nevertheless, the application of this theoretical framework to the limited observational data that we do have provides some tentative explanations about what causes voter lines in some settings. (Allen and Bernshteyn 2006) 
Some tentative findings
Despite the varied approaches, the early literature in the study of voter wait times is beginning to converge on a few basic findings that begin to describe and locate the extent of the problem of long lines.
First, long queues are not universal, but when they are long, they can be very long. Table  1 shows the distributions of reported waiting times in the national Pew Research Center surveys following the 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2012 elections. In each year, the lines that voters faced were not significantly worse than those that airline passengers might see at a moderately busy security checkpoint. Over half of the voters interviewed in each year reported that they did not have to wait in line at the polls at all, and over seventy percent in each year reported that they waited either not at all or less than fifteen minutes. However, these surveys also show that some voters endured very long lines. At least eight percent of voters in presidential election years said that they waited an hour or more, and at least two percent reported waiting two hours or more. The skewed distributions of voter wait times are also reflected in the 2008 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Surveys. In contrast to Pew's two questions ("Did you wait in line?" and "How long …"?), CCES respondents were simply asked "Approximately, how long did you have to wait in line to vote?" and provided "Not at all" as the first option. Perhaps because of this difference in question wording, fewer CCES respondents report no wait at all (as compared to the Pew respondents), but again, the majority (60% in 2008 and 70% in 2012) report waiting no longer than ten minutes. However, as in the Pew surveys, a minority of respondents (6% in 2008 and 4% in 2012) waited in very long lines, of at least an hour.
These skewed distributions are found in observational studies, as well. Herron and Smith (2013) found that 379 of 5,194 precincts in 41 of Florida's 67 counties reported zero wait times at the official 7 p.m. poll closing time in the 2012 general election, including all precincts in each of eleven counties. Second, long wait times may reduce voter turnout. Anecdotal reports of voters leaving long lines at the polls suggested the possibility that lengthy wait times deter turnout, though we cannot be certain whether some of them eventually participated. Those who encountered long lines during early voting might have been dissuaded from voting, but some may well have returned later in the day, on a later day, or on Election Day to cast a ballot. Similarly, a prospective Election Day voter who is dissuaded from getting into (or staying in) a long line might come back later, or might decide on the spot that the cost of waiting in line doesn't outweigh the probability of achieving any foreseeable benefit (a la Riker and Ordeshook 1968). We do not have systematic direct evidence that wait times reduce turnout, but both Highton (2006) and Allen and Bernshteyn (2006, 29-31 ) provide inferential evidence from precinct level analysis of Franklin County, Ohio, in the 2004 presidential election. Highton observed that the number registrants per voting machine (RPM) varied widely in Franklin County precincts, and turnout was higher in precincts with fewer RPM. Moveover, the vote for Kerry was also higher in those precincts, leading to the inference that if all precincts had 0-250 RPM, turnout in Franklin County would have been higher by 13,691, with an estimated net benefit to Kerry of 5779 votes. Allen and Bernshteyn's estimates of the number of deterred voters in Franklin County, based on a variety of assumptions, are even higher, between 18,500 and 23,445. A similar statewide analysis of the 2012 presidential election in Florida by Theodore Allen On the other hand, at least one precinct in each of seven counties remained open past midnight, in order to give the last person who was in line at 7:00 pm to opportunity to vote (per state law). Again, this suggests that many Florida voters spent very little time in line, but a significant minority had to invest a great deal of time in order to exercise the right to vote. Stein and Vonhamme's (2012, 708-9) analysis shows that Colorado primary voters who reported waiting in longer lines also were more likely to report that they voted for fewer offices on the ballot, leading to lower functional voter turnout in the elections at the bottom of the ballot.
Third, long wait times lower voters' evaluations of their experience, which, in turn, reduces their confidence in the electoral process. From the perspective of the voting experience as a voter's encounter with street level bureaucrats (poll workers), several studies of exit poll data suggest that the length of time that it takes to vote (which includes the wait time and processing time) negatively affects the voters' overall evaluation of the voting system (Stein and Vonnahme 2012) , evaluations of their polling place and encounters with the poll workers (Claassen et al. 2008; Kimball 2013) , and confidence that the election will produce a fair outcome (Claassen et al. 2013 ).
Fourth, wait times are, on average, longer in vote centers than in precincts on Election
Day. Many US states have instituted Early Voting as an alternative to Election Day voting, in which voters are given the opportunity to vote at centralized locations (such as county libraries or shopping centers) for one or two weeks leading up to an election. Early Voting is one manifestation of convenience voting in the United States (Gronke et al. 2008) , which seems to be favored by habitual voters (Berinsky 2005; Fitzgerald 2005 ) and are generally favored by local election officials as a means of relieving some of the congestion in precincts on Election Day. In addition, a few states allow Election Day ballots to be cast at Vote Centers, which are often more conveniently located than local precincts. Contrary to expectations, the bulk of the evidence so far is that wait times are longer, on average, at Early Voting and Election Day Vote Centers than at Election Day precincts. (Kimball 2013 ; Stein and Vonnahme 2012; Stewart forthcoming) The longer waits might be due to longer checkin procedures, since pollworkers have to check each voter against county wide registers and retrieve an individual ballot from a larger set of available ballots. It's also possible that habitual voters who are more likely to vote early are also more likely to take the time to vote on all questions on the ballot, resulting in lower drop-off rates. In any event, it appears that voters are willing to pay a slightly higher price (in minutes) for the convenience of voting at a time and/or place that better fits their schedule.
Fifth, wait times are often longer in urban precincts and precincts with higher proportions of minority voters. As Stewart's (forthcoming) analysis of state level data over time show, longer waits tend to be chronic rather than episodic, as states with longer wait times in 2008 also tended to have longer wait times in 2012, which might reflect both institutional practice as well as the demography of the state. Individual level analysis of survey data consistently reveal that minority voters report waiting longer to vote than white voters (Kimball 2013; Mukherjee 2009; Stewart forthcoming) , and urban voters report waiting longer than nonurban voters (Kimball 2013; Stewart forthcoming) . While Kimball (2013) finds that only a fraction of these effects are accounted for by differences in individual level transience, registration problems, and other interactions at the polling place, Stewart's (forthcoming) careful analysis of CCES data shows that much of the individual level difference between minority and white voters' wait times appears to be ecological, as whites who live in racially diverse zip codes wait longer (13 minutes, on average) than whites who live in racially homogenous zip codes (7 minutes, on average). Once again, the individual level survey data are partially corroborated by precinct level data, as Herron and Smith (2013) observe that 2012 polls generally closed later (in order to accommodate longer lines) in heavily Hispanic precincts in Miami-Dade, Broward, Hillsborough, Orange, Duval, Osceola, and Alachua counties (but not Palm Beach and Pinellas counties), and in heavily Black precincts in Hillsborough, Orange (slightly), and Osceola counties.
Waiting Times as an Application of Queueing Theory
The application of queueing theory in mathematics is one way for us to understand some of these regularities. Queue theory is the favorite perspective of the non-political scientists (engineers, mostly) who have written about the problem of voter wait times, as it provides an elegant frame from which to understand how and when lines develop, as well as the opportunity to simulate how small parameter changes might affect the length of lines. While queueing theory provides a perspective for understanding some of the findings reviewed thus far, only one study of which we're aware (Spencer and Markovits 2010) purports to test the major predictions of queueing theory with an observational study. In this section, we outline queueing theory as applied to the question of voter wait times, illustrate the value of simulation as a predictive tool, and assess the extent to which the empirical findings (including Spencer and Markovits 2010) comport with its predictions.
In its simplest expression, queueing theory posits that wait times are a function of the arrival rate, service rate, and the number of service providers. Based on those parameters, queueing theory predicts distributions of wait times that help managers allocate their labor and technical resources to achieve optimal service for shoppers, patients, consumers, and in our case, voters.
A simple example helps to illustrate how these parameters affect wait times. Imagine a very small precinct with one pollworker who can service (on average) one voter every two minutes. In those two minutes, she checks in the voter, provides a ballot, allocates time for the ballot to be marked, and accepts the completed ballot in the ballot box. Voter arrivals are assumed to be independent of one another, so lines may form if multiple voters happen to arrive at the same time. As arrivals speed up (say, one new voter every ninety seconds), the line will begin to grow quickly. Once that happens, there are three basic factors that can alleviate the growing congestion. First, the arrival rate might naturally slow again, perhaps after the morning rush is over, or at the end of the day, when voters are no longer allowed to join the line and the arrival rate is set by law at zero. Second, the pollworker can try to work at a faster pace, perhaps chatting less with voters, or by developing a routine that speeds up her service. If she successfully reduces her service rate to equal the arrival rate, the small system will achieve an equilibrium and the line will stop growing. Third, a supervisor might respond by sending a second pollworker (who can work at the same service rate independently of the first pollworker) to help serve the voters waiting in line.
Formally, (Allen and Bernshteyn 2006, 27) model wait times in this simple system as
where is the arrival rate, is the service rate, is the number of service providers, and = ÷ ( × ). The model assumes a first-in first-out principle and a Poisson distribution of arrivals, which in essence means that arrivals are independent of one another and are a steady state. Using this algorithm, we can simulate the effects of changes in one parameter on estimated wait times while holding the other parameters fixed.
In Table 3 , we simulate a precinct of 1200 voters with varying service rates, arrival rates, and numbers of pollworkers. 4 In row [1] of Table 3 , we see the simulated wait times of a precinct with two servers (pollworkers) who can each serve 20 voters per hour, with voters arriving at a rate of 25 per hour. Because of the randomness of the arrivals, lines will form, but with a median wait time of less than three minutes. Still, almost a quarter of the voters would wait longer than five minutes, and a few voters would be expected to wait over an hour. A comparison of rows [1] and [2] in Table 3 shows the striking effect of the addition of just one more pollworker (who can work at the same rate and independently of the first two pollworkers), as the wait times are nearly wiped out. Holding the arrival rate constant at 25 voters per hour, the addition of a third pollworker reduces the median wait time from two and a half minutes to about 20 seconds, and the number of voters who will wait longer than five minutes is reduced from 292 to one. As arrival rates speed up, even more voters will wait in longer lines. With 30 arrivals per hour (on average) and two pollworkers to serve them (shown in row [5] ), almost all voters will have to wait at least two minutes, and the median wait would be seven minutes. Once again, the addition of a third pollworker would significantly reduce the lines (row [6]), as the median wait time would be just under a minute, and only 19 voters would be in line for more than five minutes. It is also worth noting that the addition of a fourth pollworker (row [7] ) has rapidly diminishing effects on wait times. As Keesling has found with respect to hospital emergency room wait times, the addition of a single service provider (in our case, pollworker) can make a significant difference in alleviating wait times, but there are sharply diminished returns once the threshold has been crossed.
As Allen and Bernshteyn (2006) observe, small changes in the service time can also have huge effects on the wait times. Longer and more complex ballots, stricter checkin requirements, or different voting technologies might slow the process quite a lot, as illustrated by comparison of rows [5] and [9] in Table 3 . Compare the wait times for two pollworkers serving voters who are arriving (on average) at a rate of 30 per hour. At a service rate of 20 voters per hour (in row [5] ), the median wait time is a little over seven minutes, but a 25% reduction in service time (to 16 voters per hour, in row [9]) results in a median wait time of over half an hour, with over a third of voters waiting more than an hour. Again, the addition of a third pollworker sharply reduces the wait times under these conditions (compare rows [9] and [10]), but the 25% reduction in the service rate for three pollworkers more than doubles the median wait time (as illustrated by the comparison between rows [6] and [10])..
Of course, reality is more complex than what is represented by this simple model. In most polling stations, there are at least three stages to the voting process in each precinct on election day, as each voter must check in (identify himself or herself, sign the voter roll, and receive the appropriate ballot), proceed to the voting booth (find an open booth, read the ballot choices, and select preferences), and submit the completed ballot. In addition, there may be separate stations for voters with special needs or voters who may need to complete provisional ballots or update registration status. Supervisors are aware that each of these stages is a risk for voting queues, and recognize that a precinct with sufficient numbers of pollworkers but without enough functioning voting machines (or vice versa) can become clogged very quickly.
Moreover, arrival rates and service rates are affected by a variety of institutional, precinct level, and individual level factors, as illustrated in Table 4 . At the institutional level, we would expect arrival rates on Election Day to be higher when the election is especially salient (for example, in a presidential election in a battleground state) than in a local race that garners little attention. Similarly, we would expect that arrival rates on Election Day will be faster when siphoning opportunities, such as early voting and no-fault absentee voting, are more limited. We also expect that service rates would be slower when the ballot is longer and more complex for voters to process, which was highlighted by Allen and Bernshtyn's (2006) observation that even a small change in service times can result in large effects on waiting times. Thus far, there is mixed empirical support for the latter prediction. Spencer and Markovits (2010) do not find that ballot length significantly extended the time that it took voters in a California primary election to vote (ceteris paribus), but Allen and Bernshteyn (2006, 32) noted a positive correlation between the number of ballot initiatives and the lateness of precincts closing in Franklin County, Ohio, in the 2004 general election. Anecdotally, some Florida election supervisors did conjecture that the long general election ballot in 2012 with multiple races and several ballot propositions, all printed in two or three languages, depending on the county, did seem to prolong the time that it took some people to cast a vote.
At the precinct level, arrival rates are expected to be a function of population density (number of voters per precinct), and that appears to be consistent with much of the survey evidence. (Kimball 2013; Stewart forthcoming) . We would also expect that service rates would be faster with more pollworker experience and training, and that voting technology would affect the time that it takes to vote. The limited empirical evidence that we have suggests that pollworker experience actually prolongs service time, perhaps because experienced pollworkers are more familiar and conversational with voters in their precincts, or because they find it harder to adapt to novel procedures (Spencer and Markovits 2010, 11-12) . Spencer and Markovits (2010, 13 ) also find that DRE machines prolong the time it takes to cast a ballot, in part because the sequencing seems to encourage voters to cast complete ballots, resulting in fewer drop-offs on some ballot questions. The characteristics of voters in the precinct might also be related to arrival rates and service rates. Arrival rates vary by time of day (Spencer and Markovits 2010, 15-16) , while service rates would be longer for precincts with larger proportions of less experienced or skilled voters, voters who have additional administrative requirements (such as making registration changes or casting a provisional ballot), and with special needs voters who may require specialized equipment or assistance in casting a ballot. Service times were indeed longer for disabled voters and those who cast provisional ballots, and in precincts with lower median incomes (Spencer and Markovits 2010, 10-11) . Unexpectedly, service times were also slightly longer in precincts with higher proportions of university graduates (controlling for income), though perhaps this finding also reflects a greater tendency to submit a complete ballot.
Finally, queuing theory would lead us to expect that more resources, in terms of both people and equipment, would speed up the process of voting, but the little empirical evidence we have is also mixed. Spencer and Markovits (2010) observe no relationship between the number of pollworkers at the check-in table and service times, though both they and Allen and Bernshtyn (2006) suggest that the finding may reflect a reciprocal relationship in which pollworkers were allocated to precincts where supervisors anticipated (rightly or wrongly) heavier turnout or longer lines.
Next steps
Elections supervisors who struggle with limited staff and equipment budgets must try to allocate these resources both efficiently and equitably among precincts in order to ensure that no class of voters (especially a constitutionally suspect class) faces especially long lines. That's easier said than done, as supervisors have to estimate not only the turnout (arrival rate) in a precinct, but also the service time as a function of multiple variables, including the complexity of the ballot and the demographics of each precinct. Through the varied methodologies that scholars have employed thus far, we have made some progress in understanding how lines form. Moreover, we believe that queueing theory provides a good theoretical framework from which to begin to assess the causes and consequences of lines at voter precincts. However, as Stewart (forthcoming) laments, there is still much that we do not know (including why wait times are usually longer in minority precincts), and we think that there is much to be gained by continuing on multiple research tracks with different methods and levels of data analysis.
Modelers using queue theory should incorporate more reality in their models by (1) relaxing the steady-state arrival assumptions, recognizing that more voters arrive at polling places before and (especially) after the normal workday, and (2) including multiple stages in the voting process, from check-in, to marking a ballot at a privacy booth, to submitting a ballot in a ballot box or a modern-day equivalent. Simulations based on these more realistic models may help supervisors better understand where to deploy resources within precincts, as well as between them.
Of course, it is also important to understand the extent to which the reality on the ground comports to the models' predictions, and we believe that it is vital to continue to collect data at different levels of analysis. In short, do the elements that we've identified in Table 4 as aspects of arrival time, processing time, and service providers predict wait times as expected by queuing theory? The federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) collected valuable data at the county or township level in 2012 and plans to do so again in 2014. 5 Ideally, in order to obtain those measures across a wide variety of settings, resources would be available to scholars to monitor a sample of precincts within a state or across a few states. We could envision a study that would roughly follow the research design of Spencer and Markovits (2010) , with samples of precincts within a cluster of counties from a single large heterogeneous state. These observations would include line length, wait time, processing time at each stage, and human and equipment resources deployed to each precinct. Combined with the county level data collected by the EAC, these data will help us to understand how variations in factors affecting arrivals (such as precinct density), processing time (ballot length and complexity, pollworker experience, and voter demographics in the precinct), and service providers (number of pollworkers, voting stations, and ballot boxes) affect wait times. These data will provide indicators of the number of pollworkers in the county, the number of early-voting and election day precincts in each county, the number of provisional and absentee ballots cast (and rejected), and the type of voting equipment used. Unfortunately, these data will not include measures of our key variable of interest, wait times, nor will they be at the precinct level.
Finally, there is an assumption throughout this literature that shorter wait times are better, and wait times of zero certainly are more convenient for voters than are those of any positive length. However, supervisors of elections have limited budgets and staff, and stingy taxpayers would probably be willing to spend a few minutes in line on Election Day if they were confident that would avoid a higher tax burden. Thus, short waits (more or less evenly distributed across the electorate) might be tolerable, and they could even contribute to building social capital and confidence in the electoral system, as voters see and perhaps interact with others who are participating in the democratic process. Therefore, it is important for us to begin to assess how long is too long. In part, that is a normative question, but we could begin to look for empirical threshold levels at which functional turnout is affected by voters balking (not getting in line and never voting), reneging (getting out of line and never voting), or dropping off (completing only part of the ballot).
We have begun to make progress on these questions, but as most contributors to this literature have observed, much work remains. We hope that this paper and this workshop provides helpful guidance on the approaches and research resources that will be needed to continue this progress.
